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Of Incidents, Activities, and Maritime Jurisdiction: A
Jurisprudential Exegesis
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr.*
The Bible says that in the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth,
and water covered the earth. Back then, one can imagine that whenever a tort
occurred on the water' there was maritime jurisdiction over the claim. Then,
after God created dry land,2 there were torts everywhere; consequently,
jurisdictional dilemmas developed. The traditional solution simply provided that
if the tort occurred on navigable water there was admiralty jurisdiction, and if the
tort did not occur on navigable water there was no maritime jurisdiction.3
Of course, as things developed, maritime jurisdiction meant not only that a
federal court sitting in admiralty had the power to hear the case but also that
federal, substantive, maritime law governed,4 unless, of course, the maritime but
local doctrine applied.s In that case, state law could apply, not of its own force
but as borrowed federal law.
In'any event, when determining whether maritime tort jurisdiction existed,
locality was the critical factor. However, the locality test for jurisdiction led to
some odd problems. For instance, if someone fired a shot from the land to the
water, hitting someone on a vessel, there was admiralty jurisdiction. In that case,
the tort occurred on the water for the damage occurred on the water, and a tort
cannot really be said to have occurred until all elements of the cause of action
have accrued: fault, cause, and damage. However, if someone fired a shot from
a vessel on the water to the land and hit someone on land, there was no
jurisdiction. In that case, no tort occurred on the water because the important
element of damage had occurred on the land and not on the water.
More practically, where no shooting was involved, a simple locality test for
jurisdiction led to problems where a vessel negligently allided with an "extension
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1. I am making the simplifying assumption that torts did indeed occur on the water during this
period. I claim no such knowledge and have found no cases discussing the issue.
2. Many may be troubled by the hypothetical sequence of events set forth in the text. How
could there be torts before there were dry land and people? This is a troublesome point which space
limitations compel I pass over in this piece.
3. The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 34 (1865).
4. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S. Ct. 524 (1917).
5. See Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 75 S. Ct. 368 (1955); Mayo
v. Nissan Motor Corp., 639 So. 2d 773 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ granted and remanded, 644 So. 2d
661 (1994), on remand, 647 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994), writ denied, 651 So. 2d 280, 281
(1995); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr. & Jean Paul P. Overton, Recent United States Supreme Court
Developments in Admiralty, 55 La. L. Rev. 469 (1995). Now, the Court has authorized resort to state
law in a case involving the death of a non-seafarer which occurred in territorial waters. Yamaha
Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996).
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of the land," such as a pier, bridge, or wharf. In such a case, because the tort
culminated on land, there would be no jurisdiction. Alternatively, if the pier
owner or bridge operator was at fault in causing the allision, the vessel owner's
claim against the land-based defendant would be subject to maritime jurisdiction
because the tort culminated on the water. These jurisdictional rules led to both
substantive and procedural problems. Substantively, the common law generally
treated contributory negligence as a bar to recovery. Thus, in the pier or bridge
owner's suit against the vessel at common law, the pier or bridge owner's
contributory negligence would bar recovery. But, the maritime law employed a
divided damages rule under which a negligent plaintiff's recovery from a
negligent defendant was halved and not barred. Thus, in the vessel owner's suit
against the pier or bridge owner in admiralty, the vessel owner recovered half of
its damages. Procedurally, there was no jury trial in admiralty. Thus, while the
pier or bridge owner's common law claim against the vessel owner could be
heard by a jury, the vessel owner's admiralty claim against the pier or bridge
owner would be heard by an admiralty judge.
To deal with this somewhat anomalous state of affairs, Congress in 1948
passed the Admiralty Extension Act (AEA or the Act).' The Act provides that:
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall
extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or
property, caused by a vessel on navigable water notwithstanding that
such damage or injury be done or consummated on land.
Thus, after 1948, locality was still the test for determining admiralty jurisdiction
in tort cases but with jurisdiction also extending to cases where the tort
commenced on water (still locality) but culminated on land. Thus, for instance,
in Gutierriez v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,7 maritime jurisdiction existed over a claim
where a longshore worker fell on spilled coffee beans on a pier. The beans had
spilled from a bag being unloaded from a vessel. The Court sustained
jurisdiction over the longshore worker's claim under the AEA. In another case,'
the court sustained admiralty jurisdiction over a claim arising out of a car wreck
between two passengers who had shortly before disembarked from a "booze
cruise." One passenger alleged that the other caused him injury as a result of
being served too much liquor on the vessel's advertised "booze cruise." Thus,
a basic dram shop claim became a maritime tort claim as a result of the AEA.
But, was pure locality (plus extension) really the test even where the tort had
nothing to do with navigable water other than the happenstance of where it
"occurred"? Or, was more than locality required even on the water? The United
States Supreme Court began its ongoing answer to this question in Executive Jet
6. 46 U.S.C. app. § 740 (1994).
7. 373 U.S. 206, 83 S. Ct. 1185 (1963).
8. Duluth Superior Excursions, Inc. v. Makela, 623 F.2d 1251 (8th Cir. 1980).
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Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland.9 In Executive Jet, a flock of birds encoun-
tered an airplane on a domestic flight over Lake Erie. The plane crashed. The
Court held that, even though the "locality" of the alleged tort was arguably
maritime, there was no admiralty jurisdiction. Justice Stewart, writing for the
Court said: "claims arising from airplane accidents are not cognizable in
admiralty... [absent the wrong bearing] a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity."' Thus, in Executive Jet there was no admiralty jurisdiction
over the case before the Court, but was the logic of the decision limited to
airplane cases? To domestic flight cases? Or, did its "relationship to traditional
maritime activity" language apply to, or impact upon, other cases as well?
The Court answered some of those questions ten years later in Foremost
Insurance Co. v. Richardson." In Foremost Insurance, the Court applied the
traditional maritime activity test to a collision between two recreational vessels
on the Amite River, finding maritime jurisdiction. Responding to the argument
that pleasure boats had nothing to do with maritime commerce, the Court still
found jurisdiction, relying, in part, upon
[t]he potential disruptive impact [upon maritime commerce] of a
collision between boats on navigable waters, when coupled with the
traditional concern that admiralty law holds for navigation .... "
Justice Marshall, who wrote for the majority, also stressed the need for uniform
navigational rules.' 3
Thus, as Professor Frank Maraist has noted, after Foremost Insurance, every
maritime tort case needed to have an admiralty "flavor" before a court would
sustain admiralty jurisdiction. 4 But, how much flavor did a case have to have?
Or, how were lower courts to give meaning to the "significant relationship to
traditional maritime" activity language?
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the expositor of much
significant maritime jurisprudence and the Circuit which deals with some of the
trickiest maritime issues due to the oil and gas industry and the multipurpose
vessels the industry uses, came up with a multi-factor test for jurisdiction after
Executive Jet. In Kelly v, Smith," the court articulated a four part test which
consisted of: "[1] the functions and roles of the parties; [2] the types of vehicles
and instrumentalities involved; [3] the causation and the type of injury; and [4]
traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law."' 6 Later, in Molett v. Penrod
9. 409 U.S. 249, 93 S. Ct. 493 (1972).
10. Id. at 268, 93 S. Ct. at 504 (emphasis added).
11. 457 U.S. 668, 102 S. Ct. 2654 (1987).
12. Id. at 675, 102 S. Ct. at 2658.
13. Id. at 675-76, 102 S. Ct. at 2658-59.
14. Frank L. Maraist, Admiralty In a Nutshell 38 (1988).
15. 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973).
16. Id. at 525.
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Drilling Co., 17 the Fifth Circuit added three more factors to the Kelly test: "[5]
the impact of the event on maritime shipping and commerce; [6] the desirability
of a uniform national rule to apply to such matters; and [7] the need for
admiralty 'expertise' in the trial and decision of the case."" While the
Kelly/Molett factors seemed particularly appropriate in cases involving
multipurpose, non-traditional maritime "vessels," they were also relevant and
rational to any maritime tort case. The fourth, sixth, and seventh factors were
particularly relevant to the need for admiralty expertise and uniform maritime
rules noted in Foremost Insurance.
However, rather than accept the Kelly factors, the Supreme Court, in Sisson
v. Ruby, 9 took its own shot at giving more meaningful content to the signifi-
cant relationship to a traditional maritime activity test. Sisson arose out of a fire,
caused by a defective washer/dryer, aboard a pleasure boat docked at a marina,
which burned the boat, other boats docked nearby, and the marina itself.2" The
owner of the first burning boat (the one with the bad washer/dryer) sought
protection under the Limitation of Liability Act;21 however, the claimants
objected, arguing limitation was unavailable because there was no maritime
jurisdiction. Not deciding whether the Limitation Act provided an independent
basis for federal jurisdiction,22 the Court found tort jurisdiction under the
Executive Jet/Foremost Insurance test. Justice Marshall, again writing for the
Court, elaborated: first, the "incident causing the harm, the burning of docked
boats at a marina on navigable waters, was of a sort 'likely to disrupt [maritime]
commercial activity."' 23 At this "incident" level of the analysis the Court said
it must "assess the general features of the type of incident involved"24 to decide
if the incident has "a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce."25
Second, to sustain maritime jurisdiction, there must be a "'substantial relation-
ship' with 'traditional maritime activity' in the kind of activity from which the
incident arose, 'the storage and maintenance of a vessel ... on navigable
waters. ' ' 26 At the activity level a court must decide if "the general charac-
17. 826 F.2d 1419 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. 493 U.S. 1003, 110 S. Ct. 563 (1989).
18. 826 F.2d at 1426.
19. 497 U.S. 358, 110 S. Ct. 2892 (1990).
20. Id. at 367, 110 S. Ct. at 2894.
21. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-196 (1988).
22. See Richarson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96, 32 S. Ct. 27 (1911) (jurisdiction to limit liability
existed where the underlying action giving rise to the claim was a nonmaritime tort). On a related
issue, the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 et seq. (1988) may provide an
independent basis for jurisdiction. See generally Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 116 S.
Ct. 35 (1995).
23. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043, 1048 (1995)
(quoting Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363, 110 S. Ct. at 2896).
24. Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363, 110 S. Ct. at 2896.
25. Id. at 364 n.2, 110 S. Ct. at 2896 n.2.
26. Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1048 (quoting Sisson, 497 U.S. at 365-67, 110 S. Ct. at 2897-98).
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ter,"'27 of the "activity giving rise to the incident,"2 reveals a "substantial
relationship to traditional maritime activity."'29
Thus, after Sisson, maritime tort jurisdiction was dependent upon: (1)
location (under either the traditional location test or the Admiralty Extension Act)
and (2) maritime flavor defined in reference to (a) the incident and its potential
to disrupt maritime commerce and (b) the activity from which the incident arose
and whether that activity bore a significant relationship to a traditional maritime
activity. One will note the generality used to articulate both the incident and
activity involved.
What did Sisson mean for the Fifth Circuit's Kelly factors? In a footnote in
Sisson," the Court said that at least in a case where all the involved instrumen-
talities were engaged in similar activities (mooring at a marina), it preferred its
two part test for maritime flavor to a multi-factor test. Despite the footnote, the
Fifth Circuit adhered to the Kelly factors when determining maritime jurisdiction
after Sisson.3
Then came Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.32
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company (Great Lakes) bid on a contract with the
City of Chicago to replace pilings around several piers supporting bridges
spanning the Chicago River. Great Lakes got the contract and carried out the
work by using two barges and a tug. One barge carried pilings; the other carried
a crane. After the work was complete, an eddy formed in the river near one of
the repaired bridges. The eddy was caused by the collapsing walls or ceiling of
a freight tunnel, maintained by the City of Chicago, which ran under the river.
As the tunnel support collapsed, river water ran into the tunnel and hence to the
basements of buildings in the Chicago Loop. While no one built any arks, the
damage from the ensuing flood was serious. Many victims filed suit against
Great Lakes and the City of Chicago in state court. The plaintiffs claimed Great
Lakes had negligently weakened the tunnel structure which the City of Chicago
had negligently maintained. Great Lakes responded boldly (and predictably) by
filing a complaint in federal district court seeking to limit its liability and/or
seeking contribution and indemnity from the City. The City (joined by Grubart,
a flood victim and erstwhile state court plaintiff) filed a motion to dismiss the
federal proceeding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction which the District Court
granted. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding maritime jurisdiction.33 The
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed.34 Justice Souter wrote the
27. Sisson, 497 U.S at 365, 110 S. Ct. at 2897.
28. Id. at 364, 110 S. Ct. at 2897.
29. Id. at 364 n.2, 110 S. Ct. at 2896 n.2.
30. Id. at 365-66 n.4, 110 S. Ct. at 2897-98 n.4. See also id. at 365 n.3, 110 S. Ct. at 2897 n.3.
31. See Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 5 F.3d 877, 885-86 (5th Cir. 1993).
32. 115 S. Ct. 1043 (1995).
33. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Chicago, 3 F.3d 225 (1993).
34. As in Sisson, the Court did not decide whether the Limitation Act provided an independent
basis of jurisdiction. 115 S. Ct. at 1053.
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majority opinion; Justice O'Connor concurred; and Justices Thomas and Scalia
concurred in the judgment.
According to Justice Souter "the issue ... [was] simply whether or not a
federal admiralty court has jurisdiction over claims that Great Lakes's faulty
replacement work caused the flood damage." 3  To answer the question, the
Court first analyzed location. The tort was "done" on navigable waters. It was
also "caused by a vessel. '36 Thus, under the AEA, location seemed satisfied.
However, Grubart and the City sought to limit the reach of the AEA by requiring
that:
the damage must be close in time and space to the activity that caused
it; that it must occur "reasonably contemporaneously" with the negligent
conduct and no "farther from navigable waters than the reach of the
vessel, its appurtenances and cargo.""
The Court rejected that argument, noting that the AEA's phrase "caused by,"
should be interpreted to mean "proximate causation, 38 a more familiar, and
"less stringent" test than that proposed by Grubart and the City.
With locality out of the way, the Court next turned to the "maritime
connection inquiries. 39  The first Sisson connection question required a
"description of the incident at an intermediate level of possible generality."
40
The Court described the incident "as damages by a vessel on navigable water to
an underwater structure. 4  So put, the "potentially disruptive impact on
maritime commerce" was clear. Disruption of maritime commerce could occur
on the water itself from damaging a structure or could occur from the damage
leading to "restrictions on the navigational use of the waterway during required
repairs. "42 Turning to the activity issue, the Court characterized the activity as
"repair or maintenance work on a navigable waterway performed from a
vessel. 43 Consequently, "[d]escribed in this way, there is no question that the
activity is substantially related to traditional maritime activity, for barges and
similar vessels have traditionally been engaged in repair work similar to what
Great Lakes contracted to perform here."" On this point, the City had argued
that the Court should focus on the City's "alleged failure at properly maintaining
and operating the tunnel system ... .45 In response, the Court pointed back
35. 115 S. Ct. at 1047.
36. Id. at 1049.
37. Id. at 1049.
38. Id. at 1049.
39. Id. at 1050.
40. Id. at 1051.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1052.
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to Foremost Insurance where it had said the wrong there "involves the negligent
operation of a vessel on navigable waters. .. . In Grubart, the Court said:
By using the word "involves," we made it clear that we need to look
only to whether one of the arguably proximate causes of the incident
originated in the maritime activity of a tortfeasor: as long as one of the
putative tortfeasors was engaged in traditional maritime activity the
allegedly wrongful activity will "involve" such traditional maritime
activity and will meet the second nexus proxy. Thus ... [t]he
substantial relationship test is satisfied when at least one alleged
tortfeasor was engaging in activity substantially related to traditional
maritime activity and such activity is claimed to have been a proximate
cause of the incident.47
The Court next defended its incident/activity test against attacks regarding
its susceptibility to abuse through over generalization. Petitioners had claimed
that if the "activity" at issue in Grubart was maritime related, "virtually every
activity involving a vessel on navigable waters" would be "a traditional maritime
activity sufficient to invoke maritime jurisdiction. '48  The Court did not
consider that criticism "fatal," noting that normally a tort involving a vessel on
navigable water would fall within admiralty jurisdiction.
Importantly, the City had argued that in suits "involving land based parties
and injuries,"49 the Court should adopt a "totality of the circumstances" test for
admiralty jurisdiction." Noting the similarity between the City's proposed test
and the Fifth Circuit's Kelly test, the Court was not persuaded. Importantly, the
Court noted the "proposed four- or seven-factor test would be hard to apply,
jettisoning relative predictability for the open-ended rough-and-tumble of factors,
inviting complex argument in a trial court and a virtually inevitable appeal."'"
Critically, one notes that the Court's decision in Grubart implies that in a
multiple, concurrent tortfeasor case where there is maritime jurisdiction over a
maritime joint tortfeasor, there is maritime jurisdiction over the land based
tortfeasor.
As noted, Justice O'Connor concurred. On the important multiple tortfeasor
point, while she agreed with the Court's decision, she did not read its opinion to
mean that once a court found it had admiralty jurisdiction over a claim against
a party, it must then exercise admiralty jurisdiction over all claims and parties.
46. Id. (quoting Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674, 102 S. Ct. 2654, 2658
(1982)).
47. Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1052.
48. 'Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner Grubart at 6, Grubart, 115 S. Ct. 1043 (Nos. 93-762, 93-
1094)). That was not a "fatal criticism." Id.
49. Id. at 1053.
50. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner City of Chicago at 32, Grubart, 115 S. Ct. 1043 (Nos. 93-762,
93-1094)).
51. Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1055.
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"Rather, the court should engage in the usual supplemental jurisdiction and
impleader inquiries." s2
Justices Thomas and Scalia concurred in the judgment. Justice Thomas
would jettison the Sisson test and "restore the jurisdictional inquiry to the simple
question whether the tort occurred on a vessel on the navigable waters of the
United States."53
So, after all, what does Grubart mean? Several basic points merit
examination. First, the Court's painstaking analysis of maritime flavor in a case
arising under the AEA means that a significant connection to maritime activity
is required in an AEA case. Put differently, the AEA does not provide an
independent basis of maritime jurisdiction. While the United States Fifth Circuit
had required maritime flavor in AEA cases before Grubart,4 the Supreme
Court had never expressly so held. While Grubart does not per se state that
maritime flavor is required in AEA cases, the simple fact is that Grubart is an
AEA case, and the bulk of the Court's opinion expressly deals with the maritime
flavor issue. Thus, one is neither reaching nor stretching to read Grubart to
provide maritime flavor is required in an AEA case.
Sticking with the AEA for a second, the Grubart case establishes that the
words "caused by" in the AEA mean "proximately caused by." While the words
proximate cause defy meaningful definition, most tort lawyers know proximate
cause when they see it, or at least they know trouble when they see it in the
guise of a proximate cause issue. As the Court noted, in regards to "proximate
cause" and AEA jurisdiction: "Normal practice permits a party to establish
jurisdiction at the outset of a case by means of a nonfrivolous assertion of
jurisdictional elements."55  So while the proximate cause issue may present
significant substantive gyrations, it need not stifle decision at the jurisdictional
level.
Second, in Grubart the Court expressly and clearly rejected a multi-factor
test for admiralty jurisdiction. The Court in Sisson initially articulated the
incident/activity test for maritime flavor. There, the Court refused to employ a
multi-factor test, like the Fifth Circuit's Kelly factors, in a case where the
relevant instrumentalities were engaged in similar activities. In Grubart, the
Court flatly rejected multi-factor tests in a case where the relevant parties were
engaged in different types of activities. Put simply, Grubart sounded the death
knell for Kelly. Since Grubart, the Fifth Circuit, en banc, in Coats v. Penrod
Drilling Corp.,56 has also abandoned Kelly, applying the Sisson/Grubart
incident/activity test." Thus, Sisson lives, and debate about the appropriate
52. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
54. Sohyde Drilling & Marine Co. v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 644 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir.
1981).
55. Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1050.
56. 61 F.3d 1113 (5th Cir. 1995).
57. For another post-Grubart jurisdiction decision, see White v. United States, 53 F.3d 43 (4th
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"levels of generality" on incidents and activities will heat up. Lawyers arguing
jurisdiction in maritime cases will learn to manipulate their characterizations of
the incident and activity to further their clients' interests. When water is in the
air, it will be a rare case in which a party asserting maritime jurisdiction will not
be able at least to make a colorable argument for jurisdiction based upon its
characterization of the relevant incident and activity. No doubt jurisdiction
decisions in particular cases will not be dramatically different; only the words
will change, from Kelly's factors to incidents and activities.
Before moving on, note that all the Supreme Court opinions developing the
maritime flavor tests have involved what we may call "vehicle" events. For
instance, Executive Jet involved a plane crash; Foremost Insurance involved a
collision between two vessels; Sisson involved a fire on a vessel; and Grubart
involved "construction" vessels causing damage on land. It is easy to see how,
in such cases, the Court would focus on maritime commerce when analyzing the
relevant "incident," i.e., whether the incident has the potential to disrupt maritime
commerce.
Traditionally, courts have said that one of the reasons for the creation and
existence of maritime jurisdiction was the development, preservation, and
protection of maritime commerce." Thus, it is not surprising that the Court has
been concerned, in developing its incident/activity test for maritime flavor, with
the potential disruption of maritime commerce. Interestingly, the Court has not
been concerned with actual disruption of maritime commerce but the potential
for disruption. Thus, when one considers the potential disruption required at the
incident level of the Sisson/Grubart test, one considers not the real world of the
case before the court but a hypothetical universe potentially threatened by an
incident like the one which actually occurred. Running through the facts of the
four Supreme Court maritime flavor cases will illustrate how the incident prong
of the jurisdictional test might be applied.
In Executive Jet, a plane crashed into Lake Erie. How would one describe
the incident? Let's say a plane crash into domestic waters.59 Would that have
the potential to disrupt maritime commerce? "You better, you better, you
bet!" ' My God, the plane could have crashed into a vessel; or, it could have
blocked some important navigable waterway for an extended period. Those
potential, hypothetical events would disrupt commerce.
In Foremost Insurance, two pleasure vessels collided on the Amite River in
our own, great state of Louisiana. A man was killed in the collision. What was
the incident? Let's start by calling it a collision between two vessels on a
navigable waterway. That's accurate but general. Certainly if a court articulates
Cir. 1995) (jurisdiction over injury suffered when plaintiff hit her head falling from a gangway).
58. Cf. William R. Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers,
Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 Am. J. Legal Hist. 117 (1993).
59. Of course, we could just say a plane crash. But that would probably be too general because
it would take out all reference to water.
60. The Who, You Better, You Better, You Bet, on Face Dances (MCA Records 1981).
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the incident at that level of generality, the incident has the potential to disrupt
maritime commerce. The vessels could have been commercial vessels; they
could have been huge tankers. Of course, they weren't. But, hypothetically,
they could have been. Now, even if we get more daring (as the Court itself
seems to have done in Foremost) and define the incident as a collision between
two recreational vessels on a navigable waterway, there is still the potential for
a disruption of maritime commerce. You see, if the collision between the vessels
blocked a navigable waterway or caused the cessation of commerce on a
navigable waterway, maritime commerce could potentially be stopped, i.e.,
adversely affected. But, and I don't mean to be difficult here, what about the
fact that the Amite is not one of your major American waterways? Well, if you
go back and reread Foremost Insurance, you will see that the Amite's lack of
commercial activity doesn't really matter. When you are dealing with hypotheti-
cal worlds, one concerns one's self not only with what might have happened but
with where it might have happened; that is, one is not limited to where the event
actually occurred. Even though the collision in Foremost occurred on the Amite
River in Louisiana, the Court noted it could have occurred at the mouth of the
St. Lawrence Seaway.6 If it had, of course, there could be major disruption
of maritime commerce. Potentially, no commerce from the Atlantic could have
gotten to or from the Great Lakes. So, the impact of a collision between two
recreational vessels on the Amite River in Louisiana could be felt all over the
commercial world.62
How about Sisson? There, the incident was the burning of docked boats at
a marina. Did such an event have the potential to disrupt maritime commerce?
Well surely if the burning boat was a commercial vessel, there was real
disruptive potential. But what if it wasn't? Well, even then, if the fire spread
to commercial vessels or necessitated keeping commercial vessels in or out of
the marina, there was still the potential to disrupt maritime commerce. But, what
if there were no commercial vessels in the marina? Again, if the fire necessitat-
ed keeping vessels out of (or confined) in the relevant port, disruption would be
possible. And, what if there were no commercial vessels in or approaching the
relevant port? Then, the potential that the fire could have occurred somewhere
else, where people were engaging in maritime commerce, would no doubt be
enough to satisfy the incident prong of the maritime flavor test.
Turning to Grubart, the incident there was described by the Court as:
damage to an underwater structure by a vessel on navigable waters. Did that
have the potential to disrupt maritime commerce? Certainly, for if repair to the
underwater structure necessitated shutting down a navigable waterway to
61. One wonders why the Court took the hypothetical so far north. I mean if the collision had
occurred in the Gulf of Mexico at the mouth of the Mississippi River, there would have been a
potential disruption of maritime commerce. See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d
1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903, 106 S. Ct. 3271 (1986).
62. One is left to wonder whether the Court will take a similarly broad view of a defendant's duty
(or proximate cause) to an injured maritime plaintiff in a personal injury suit. It is doubtful.
[Vol. 56
MARITIME JURISDICTION
maritime commerce, disruption would occur. In fact, that is exactly what
happened in Grubart (finally a case where there was an actual disruption of
maritime commerce). Pushed to the extreme, if the navigable waterway totally
disappeared into the underwater structure, there would be no more navigable
water on which to sustain maritime commerce. This would not be like parting
the Red Sea; it would be totally draining it.
After this little sojourn down the memory lane of admiralty jurisdiction
jurisprudence, albeit applying the maritime flavor incident test, I am left with the
impression that almost any case involving a vehicle event will pass the incident
prong of the test. But, let's move from crashing, colliding, burning, and
damaging incidents to less DeMillian occurrences. What about a plain old
personal injury case? Suppose someone (a guest or passenger) fell on an oil spot
on the deck of a cruise ship on navigable waters. Would there be maritime
jurisdiction over such a slip and fall case? In just such a case, the Supreme
Court has held maritime law, and not the "land" law of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, applies. 63 But that was before Sisson and Grubart; what about now?
Clearly, under a pure locality test, there would be jurisdiction in our little
hypothetical slip and fall case. But what about under the maritime flavor test
after Grubart? What's the incident? How about a person slipping and falling
on the deck of a vessel in navigable waters? Sounds good to me. Now, here's
the rub; does the incident test have to have, as it has in the Supreme Court to
date, the potential to disrupt maritime commerce? If it does, then can we really
say that a slip and fall has the potential to disrupt maritime commerce? We
could resort to a hypothetical world, as the Court has done in its post-Foremost
jurisprudence. In slip and fall cases, we could imagine that so many people fell
on the oil spot and were injured so seriously that there was no one left to steer
the ship. Then we could imagine the unsteered ship colliding with an oil tanker
(either at the mouth of the Mississippi or the St. Lawrence Seaway or even Puget
Sound), shutting down maritime commerce. Or, we could imagine that even if
only one person slipped and fell, that slipper's injuries might be so severe that
a commercial vessel had to be diverted to save him or had to wait until
helicopters came and brought the injured victim to a land-based hospital.
Certainly, if any of these events occurred, they would have the potential to
disrupt maritime commerce."
What about a claim by a land based shipyard worker who has contracted
asbestosis, allegedly from installing asbestos in ships? Several courts that have
considered the issue have concluded they do not have maritime jurisdiction over
such claims. 65 But, just for the sake of intellectual curiosity, what would the
incident be? Contraction of illness or injury in the shipbuilding process? If so,
63. Kernarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 79 S. Ct. 406 (1959).
64. See, e.g., Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 61 F.3d 1113 (5th Cir. 1995).
65. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. United States, 846 F.2d 888 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 965, 109 S. Ct. 490 (1988); Woessner v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 757 F.2d 634 (5th Cir.
1985).
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does that incident have the potential to disrupt maritime commerce? Yes,
because if everyone building ships gets sick, there's no one to build ships, and
there are no new vessels to engage in maritime commerce.
How about an injury to a worker on a fixed platform on the Outer
Continental Shelf or on a platform in territorial waters? Courts have traditionally
not found maritime jurisdiction over such cases; platforms are not vessels. 66
Additionally, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act67 says state law applies
where not inconsistent with applicable federal law, and state law applies on the
platform in state water as well. But, now, what about under the maritime flavor
test? Let's describe the incident as injury to a worker on a platform located over
navigable waters. So described, is there a potential disruption of maritime
commerce? Well, if the rescue effort reached some hypothetically epic level,
there could be potential disruption of maritime commerce. And if the injury
arose out of some horrible explosion and fire on the platform, disruption
becomes not just a hypothetical possibility but a downright hypothetical
probability.
Rather than go on, which would be hypothetically possible, let us stop to
consider whether the incident test promises to accomplish anything. Or, more
practically, does it promise to exclude any case from the reach of maritime
jurisdiction? Arguably not. All of the actual cases discussed, as well as the
hypotheticals, passed the incident test. Some disputes which have never been
subject to maritime jurisdiction (the asbestosis claims and the platform injury
claims) satisfy the incident test. Other claims, which have long been the subject
of maritime jurisdiction (the slip and fall cases), pass the incident test, but they
require hypothetical concerns at a level that approaches silliness. One way to
solve the incident test's inability to seriously deal with the typical, but small,
personal injury claim would be to say that the incident must either have the
potential to disrupt maritime commerce or otherwise impact upon another
traditional concern of admiralty, such as the rights of those injured on vessels.
Of course, problems still remain because the incident test doesn't seem to
exclude any cases from jurisdiction. One way to solve this little dilemma would
be to admit that if a prong of a jurisdictional test does not exclude any
meaningful case from jurisdiction, maybe that prong of the test is unnecessary
and should be done away with.
Evidently, given the breadth of the incident prong of the maritime flavor
test, the "activity" inquiry-does the activity have a significant relationship to a
traditional maritime activity-will bear the significant load in the jurisdiction
determination. No doubt it would be simpler to adopt the views articulated by
the concurring opinions in Sisson (Justice Scalia) and Grubart (Justice Thomas).
Anytime there is a tort on a vessel on navigable waters there is maritime
jurisdiction. The simplicity of the proposed jurisdictional rule is its appeal.
66. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 89 S. Ct. 1835 (1969).
67. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1988).
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Under the incident/activity test, the incident inquiry is potentially meaning-
less. Thus, the true question in determining maritime tort jurisdiction will be
whether the activity at issue bears a significant relationship to a traditional
maritime activity. Traditional maritime activities should be governed by uniform
maritime rules. That was one of the justifications for sustaining maritime
jurisdiction in Foremost Insurance. Anytime there is a tort on a vessel on
navigable water the relevant activities will normally be related to some traditional
maritime activities like navigation, mooring, or construction from a vessel. But
what about torts that occur on vessels, like slips and falls? Most often if they
arise out of the failure to maintain a vessel or the failure to provide a reasonably
careful crew, one will say that those cases too arise out of traditional maritime
activities. What about torts that occur on the water but not on a vessel, such as
two surf boards colliding? Perhaps there, the court must examine the activity
with more care; however, such cases should be rare, and one wonders whether
a uniform rule is required or whether each state facing the problem of surf board
collisions ought to be able to come up with its own rule.
Whatever might be said for simpler jurisdictional tests, we are left with the
incident/activity test. Lawyers, courts, and commentators must seek to achieve
intermediate levels of possible generality."
Additionally, Grubart arguably says there is maritime jurisdiction over
claims against land based, non-maritime tortfeasors where there is maritime
jurisdiction over a maritime tortfeasor and the land based and maritime torts arise
out of the same nucleus of operative facts. Those were the facts of Grubart; an
alleged maritime tortfeasor (Great Lakes) concurred with an alleged land based
tortfeasor (Chicago) to cause damage to others (flooded basement owners).
Normally, one would expect that if there were maritime jurisdiction over a
maritime tortfeasor, a federal court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
a non-maritime tortfeasor.69 But the language of Grubart goes even further.
In rejecting a "totality of the circumstances,"70 multi-factor test, the Court said:
Of course one could claim it to be odd that under Sisson a land-based
party (or more than one) may be subject to admiralty jurisdiction, but
it would appear no less odd under the city's test that a maritime
tortfeasor in the most traditional mould might be subject to state
common-law jurisdiction. Other things being equal, it is not evident
why the first supposed anomaly is worse than the second. But other
things are not even equal. As noted just above, Congress has already
made the judgment in the Extension Act, that a land-based victim may
68. Cries for return to a pure locality test will continue. See, e.g., Matthew Harrington, After the
Flood: Cleaning Up the Test for Admiralty Jurisdiction Over Tort, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1 (1995).
69. I believe this is the way Justice O'Connor viewed the case. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043, 1055 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 1053.
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properly be subject to admiralty jurisdiction. Surely a land-based
tortfeasor has no claim to supposedly more favorable treatment.7
Read the last two sentences again; don't they stand for the proposition that the
land based tortfeasor is subject to maritime jurisdiction? That's what they say
to me. What is the effect of that? Subjecting a claim to maritime jurisdiction
means not only that a federal court can hear the case, it also means that the
claim will be decided under the substantive law of admiralty. Substantive
maritime law will apply to the claim. Does that mean that the obligations of the
City of Chicago in regards to the operation of an underground (alright underwa-
ter too) tunnel are decided under rules applicable to vessels passing one another
on navigable waters, or under the general maritime law? The inappropriateness
of that happenstance is mitigated by the fact that an admiralty court may adopt,
or borrow, state law where a uniform federal rule neither exists nor is necessary.
As the Court said in Grubart:
Contrary to what the city suggests ... exercise of federal admiralty
jurisdiction does not result in automatic displacement of state law ....
[T]he city's proposal to synchronize the jurisdictional enquiry with the
test for determining the applicable substantive law would discard a
fundamental feature of admiralty law, that federal admiralty courts
sometimes do apply state law. 2
So, the flooded basement owner's claims against the City might be decided under
state law even though those claims would be decided by an admiralty judge.
Practically, if the claims are subject to admiralty jurisdiction and are heard
in federal court and there is no basis for federal jurisdiction other than admiralty,
the claims against the City would be decided by a judge. There would be no
jury trial. Or, as in Grubart, the claims against the City might be decided by a
federal judge in the larger context of a limitation proceeding. What if, in a case
where maritime jurisdiction existed over maritime and land based defendants,
there were a settlement between the plaintiff and the maritime defendant? If
Grubart means what it says, there would still be maritime jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs claims against the land based tortfeasor. But, it seems doubtful a
federal court would retain admiralty jurisdiction over the case if there were
adequate time before trial to prevent prejudice to the parties should the court
dismiss the claim, sending it to state court. Federal judges would no doubt take
the same tack they would employ in a supplemental jurisdiction case where the
claims against a "federal" defendant were resolved and only claims against a
non-diverse "state" law defendant remained.
In conclusion, Grubart is the latest in the Supreme Court's maritime flavor
cases. It establishes that maritime flavor is required in an AEA case. It provides
71. Id. at 1054.
72. Id.
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that "caused by" in the AEA means proximately caused by. After Grubart, the
Kelly v. Smith multi-factor jurisdiction test is dead. It is replaced by an
incident/activity test. The first prong of the test may well be meaningless or, at
the least, may lead to strained interpretations. The second prong alone may not
affect much of anything, in terms of the reach of maritime jurisdiction. Lastly,
Grubart literally calls for the exercise of maritime jurisdiction over land based
tortfeasors in certain joint tortfeasor cases. But practically, that extension may
mean little. In the end, one is left wondering whether maritime flavor has added
much, if anything, except perhaps lawyers' fees, to the development of maritime
jurisdiction. It's still probably true that anytime a tort occurs on the water there
will be maritime tort jurisdiction. And anytime a tort begins on the water and
ends on the land there will be maritime jurisdiction. Most often the flavor of
such cases will be maritime however you articulate the test.

